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Case No. 20150144-CA-SC 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RlQO M. PEREA, 
Petitioner/ Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/ Appellee. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Perea appeals the denial of his rule 60(b) motion for relief from 
judgment following summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
The Supreme Court poured this case over to this Court. Generally, this Court has 
jurisdiction over cases transferred from the Supreme Court under Utah Code section 78A-
. J 4-103(2)0). However, this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because Perea failed 
to file a notice of appeal following denial of his rule 60(b) motion for relief from 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The district court summarily dismissed Perea's petition for post-conviction relief 
because the claims in the petition had already been fully adjudicated on direct appeal. 
R67. Perea filed a timely notice of appeal. R 72. While that appeal was pending, Perea 
filed a rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment in the district court. The appeal was 
stayed for 60 days and remanded for a ruling on the rule 60(b) motion. R202. The district 
court denied Perea' s motion for relief from judgment. R321-24. In his brief, Perea does 
not challenge the summary dismissal of his petition. He only challenges the denial of his 
rule 60(b) motion. But Perea did not file a notice of appeal following denial of his rule 
60(b) motion. 
1. Should this appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Perea did 
not file a timely notice of appeal following denial of his rule 60(b) motion? 
Standard of review. "An appellate court's determination of whether it has 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal is a question of law." State v.Norris, 2002 UT App 305, 15, 
57 P.3d 238. Because it is a threshold issue, the question of jurisdiction is addressed 
before resolving other claims. State v. Houston, 2011 UT App 350, 16,263 P.3d 1226. 
2.A. Did the district court correctly deny Perea's motion for relief from 
judgment alleging newly discovered evidence because it was untimely under rule 
60(b)(2)? 
2.B. Alternatively, did the district court correctly deny the motion because it did 
not justify setting aside the judgment even if the motion sounded in rule 60(b)(6)? 
Standard of review. A district court's denial of a rule 60(b) motion is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. When the denial turns in part on the district court's interpretation 
of the rule, the underlying legal determinations are reviewed for correctness. Carter v. 
State, 2015 UT 38, 115, 345 P.3d 737. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains: Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of facts. 1 
After waiving his Miranda rights, Appellant Riqo Perea confessed that he fired 
several gunshots from an SUV toward a wedding party. Perea killed two people, and 
seriously injured two others. Seven eyewitnesses, including three who were in the SUV, 
corroborated all or part of his confession. 
The drive-by shooting 
Perea is an Ogden Trece gang member. TR 1925 :31. 2 Around 1 a.m. in August 
2007, Perea and several friends visited an Ogden home. TRI 925:26-28, 31, 39-40. Perea 
rode in the front passenger seat of an SUV driven by Dominique Duran. TRI 924:6-7; 
1923 :65. Across the street, several people celebrated a wedding. TR 1922:76-78, 144, 
155. Some of the partygoers belonged to the rival Nortenos gang. TR1925:32; 1926:21, 
27-28, 97. 
An argument erupted between some in Perea's group and some of the partygoers. 
TR1922:83-85; 1924:9-11; 1925:29-30. Gang insults were heatedly exchanged and an 
unknown person fired a gun into the air once or twice. TRI 922:85-86, 125, 136, 147-48; 
1925:30-31. Perea and his friends then got back into their vehicles, Perea again sitting in 
the front passenger seat. TR.1922:105-06, 110; 1924:6-7, 13-17; 1925:10, 32-33. 
1 Consistent with appellate standards, the State recites the facts in a light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ,r 3,243 P.3d 1250. 
2 References to the trial record are cited as TR References to the post-
conviction record are cited as R 
.., 
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The SUV slowly pulled away, coasting west along the street. TRI 922:86, I 07, 
150. Perea climbed out of the passenger window, reached over the roof, and fired ten 
shots at the wedding party. TR1922:86, 89, 150; 1923:59; 1925:10-11, 20-21, 32-34; 
State's Exhibit 80 at 3. 
Sarah Valencia and Sabrina Prieto stood on a walkway of the home where the 
party was held. TRI 922: I 04-05. Valencia testified that she saw Perea fire from the SUV 
at the pm1y guests. TR1922:86, 95, 107. As the shots rang out, Valencia ducked and ran. 
TR1922:87-88, 108. Valencia tried to grab Prieto's arm, but lost her grip. Id. Valencia 
looked back to see Prieto fall on the doorstep. Id. Prieto had been fatally shot. 
TRI 922:63-65. 
Richard Esquivel stood on the grass. TRI 922: 145-46. Upon hearing gunfire, 
Esquivel ran, stopping near his cousin Rocendo Nevarez who stood by a white car parked 
in the driveway. TR 1922: 149-50. Esquivel saw someone climb out of the passenger side 
of the SUV and begin shooting over the vehicle's roof. Id. Esquivel was shot in the 
"back shoulder" and hip but survived. TRI 922: 150-51, 161-62. Nevarez was fatally shot 
in the back. TRI 922:49. 
Keri Garcia stood in the driveway when Perea started shooting. TRI 922: 123-25. 
She turned and ran. TR 1922: I 26, 13 8. She was shot once in the back but survived. 
TR1922:128. She testified that all the shots came from the road. TR1922:127. 
Lacey Randall stood beside her car-the white car parked in the driveway. 
TRI 923: I 0-13. She testified that she saw someone sitting on the passenger windowsill of 
the SUV as it pulled away and that all the shots came from the SUV. Id. 
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Elias Garcia sat directly behind Perea in Duran's SUV and saw Perea climb back 
in with a gun in his hand. TRI 925 :32-34. Garcia and fellow passenger Angelo Gallegos 
both testified that Perea was the shooter. TR1925:10-11, 20-21, 33. Duran, who was 
~ romantically involved with Perea, was reluctant to testify that he was the shooter, but 
admitted telling police that the shots came from the passenger side of her vehicle where 
Perea was hanging out the window. TR1924:6, 13-18. After climbing back into the SUV, 
Perea threatened the passengers that if they "said anything, there would be a bullet with 
[their] name on it." TR1925:10-12. 
After waiving · his Miranda rights, Perea confessed to having fired at the 
partygoers from the passenger window of Duran's SUV. TR652; State's Exhibit 80. 
Perea was 19 years and 9 months old at the time of the murders. TRI 909:22. 
B. Trial court proceedings. 
Perea was charged with two counts each of aggravated murder and attempted 
murder. TR6-7. A jury convicted Perea as charged. TRI 375-84. 
Perea was sentenced to life without parole for both aggravated murder counts and 
three years to life for the attempted murder counts. TRI 569; 1928: 164. 
C. Appellate proceedings. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68, 322 P.3d 624. 
D. Post-conviction proceedings. 
Perea timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. RI. On January 12, 2015, 
:;j the district court summarily dismissed the petition because the petition raised only issues 
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that the supreme court had already addressed on direct appeal. R67, Addendum B. Perea 
filed a notice of appeal on February 11, 2015. R72. 
On July 23, 2015, Perea filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to rule 
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R88. This Court stayed the appeal for sixty 
days and temporarily remanded the case back to the district court for the limited purpose 
of ruling on the motion. R202. The district court denied the motion. R32 l-24, 
Addendum C. 
Perea did not file a notice of appeal following denial of his rule 60(b) motion for 
relief from judgment. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. This Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because Perea failed to file a 
notice of appeal following denial of his rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. 
Because this Court lacks jurisdiction, the appeal must be dismissed. 
II. If this Court has jurisdiction, the district court ruling should be affirmed 
because the district court correctly denied Perea' s rule 60(b) motion for relief from 
judgment. Alleging newly discovered evidence, the motion was untimely under rule 
60(b )(2) because it was not filed within 90 days after the judgment. The motion could 
not fall under the "catch-all" provision of rule 60(b )( 6) because it clearly alleged newly 
discovered evidence. But even if the motion implicated rule 60(b)(6), the lower court 
properly denied the motion because it did not raise a meritorious basis to justify setting 




THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION BECAUSE PEREA FAILED TO 
FILE A NOTICE OF APPEAL FROM THE FINAL ORDER. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Perea's appeal because he did not file any 
notice of appeal from the final order on which he seeks reversal. Although he filed a 
timely notice of appeal from the order summarily dismissing his post-conviction petition, 
he does not challenge that order on appeal. Instead, he seeks relief only from the order 
denying his rule 60(b) motion. But he did not invoke this Court's jurisdiction to review 
that order by filing, as appellate rules require, a timely notice of appeal from that separate 
final order. 
The district court summarily dismissed Perea's post-conviction petition. R67. 
Perea filed a timely notice of appeal from the order of dismissal on February 11, 2015. 
R 70. Then on July 23, 2015, Perea filed a motion for relief from judgment under rule 
,.;;J 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R88. This Court stayed the appeal and 
temporarily remanded the case back to the district court for the limited purpose of ruling 
on the rule 60(b) motion. R202. The district court denied Perea's motion. R321-24. 
Perea did not amend his prior notice of appeal and did not file a new notice of appeal 
following denial of his motion for relief from judgment. 
Perea's appellate brief does not challenge the district court's order of summary 
dismissal. It alleges only that the district court erred in denying his motion for relief from 
judgment. Aplt. Br. pp. 2, 12. 
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This Court lacks jurisdiction to review that order because Perea failed to file a 
notice of appeal following denial of his rule 60(b) motion. "A ruling on a rule 60(b) 
motion culminates in a separate, appealable order and, thus, may not be included in an 
existing appeal because the issues raised in the appeal predated the ruling on the rule 
60(b) motion." Dennett v. Ferber, 2013 UT App 209, 13, 309 P.3d 313. An appellate 
court "lacks jurisdiction to resolve issues raised in a ruling on a rule 60(b) motion unless 
a new notice of appeal has been filed." Id. 
'"[A]n order denying relief under rule 60(b) is a final appealable order."' C.M v. 
State, 2014 UT App 234, 114, 336 P.3d 1069, quoting Amica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950, 970 (Utah App 1989). Therefore, if an appellant does not file notice of 
appeal within thirty days after entry of the final order denying relief under rule 60(b ), this 
Court lacks jurisdiction to review the order. Id. 
This Court lacks jurisdiction to review denial of Perea's rule 60(b) motion because 
he did not file a notice of appeal following denial of his motion. Once a court determines 
that it lacks jurisdiction, it retains only the authority to dismiss the action. Pleasant 
Grove City v. Orvis, 2007 UT App 74, i119, 157 P.3d 355. This Court should dismiss the 
appeal. 
II. 
ALTERNATIVELY, PEREA'S RULE 60(b) MOTION WAS UNTIMELY AND 
DID NOT JUSTIFY SETTING ASIDE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION. 
Even if this Court determines it has jurisdiction to review Perea's challenge to the 
order denying his rule 60(b) motion, that ruling was correct. Perea's motion sounded 
under rule 60(b )(2) because it alleged newly discovered evidence; but it was untimely 
-8-
because Perea did not file the motion within ninety days as rule 60(b )(2) strictly requires. 
And even if the rule 60(b) motion implicated rule 60(b)(6), which does not have a strict 
timeliness component, the motion did not justify relief from the judgment since it 
amounted to an improper attempt to add a new claim to the petition. The district court 
thus did not abuse its discretion in denying the post-judgment motion irrespective of 
which rule 60(b) subsection the motion implicated. 
A. The motion for relief from judgment was properly denied because it 
was untimely. 
I. The motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of 
the judgment as required under rule 60(b)(2). 
Perea asserts that his rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment was "premised 
entirely upon a recantation of ... Sarah Valencia." Aplt. Br. p. 11. He concedes that Ms. 
Valencia did not come to his counsel's office and sign her affidavit until July 2, 2015. Id. 
at if6. He also acknowledges that the lower court summarily dismissed his petition on 
v; January 12, 2015, but he did not file his rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment until 
July 23, 2015. Id. p. 11; see also R67, 88. Perea grounded his motion entirely on new 
evidence- the affidavit signed by Sarah Valencia on July 2, 2015. R91, 148-49. 
"Rule 60(b) requires that a motion based upon subsection (2)-newly discovered 
evidence-be brought within ninety days of the judgment." Carter v. State, 2015 UT 38, 
~ 17, 345 P.3d 737; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b ). Perea did not file his motion until 192 
days after the district court entered its final order of summary dismissal. The district 
court correctly ruled that the rule 60(b) motion was untimely under rule 60(b )(2). R3 22. 
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The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for relief from 
judgment because the motion was untimely. 
2. Perea cannot use the rule 60(b )(6) "catch-all" provision when his 
claim clearly falls under rule 60(b )(2) by alleging newly discovered 
evidence. 
"Rule 60(b )(6) is the 'catch-all' provision of rule 60(b )." Menzies v. Galetka, 
2006 UT 8 I, 171, 150 P.3d 480. The law is clear that a "party may not resort to 
subsection ( 6)' s catchall provision when the grounds for relief fall within subsections ( 1) 
through (5)." Carter v. State, 2015 UT 38 at 117. "Otherwise, a party could use 
subsection (6) to circumvent the ninety-day time limitation for filing motions grounded in 
the reasons set forth in subsections ( 1) through (3 ). " Id.; see also Bodell Const. Co. v. 
Robbins, 2014 UT App 203, 115, 334 P.3d 1004; Kanzee v. Kanzee, 668 P.2d 495, 497 
(Utah 1983 ). A party whose grounds for relief from a judgment or order are properly 
encompassed within the first subsections of the rule "cannot avoid the three-month 
limitation by employing the 'catchall' subsection." Matter of Estate of Pepper, 711 P .2d 
261, 263 (Utah 1985). "Because rule 60(b )(6) is meant to operate as a residuary clause, it 
may not be relied upon if the asserted grounds for relief fall within any other subsection 
of rule 60(b)." Menzies, 2006 UT 81 at ,11. 
Perea's grounds for relief clearly fall within rule 60(b )(2) because the affidavit is 
new evidence. Because his claim is clearly encompassed by subsection (2), Perea may 
not use the catchall provision of subsection (6) to circumvent the ninety-day time 
limitation for filing a motion for relief from judgment based on alleging newly 
discovered evidence. Perea provides no facts or argument to surmount this problem. 
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Perea asserts without argument that "there can be little dispute that the fact that the 
State's main witness committed perjury does not fit within ... (b)(2) newly discovered 
evidence." Aplt. Br. p. 14. But saying it does not make it so. A newly discovered 
recantation of trial testimony clearly does fall within rule 60(b )(2)' s newly discovered 
evidence provision. And as addressed above, the motion for relief from judgment 
alleging newly discovered evidence was untimely. 
B. Even if Perea's motion implicated rule 60{b){6), the district court still 
properly denied it because it amounted to an improper attempt to 
amend the petition. 
Perea argues that the district court erred in denying the motion for relief from 
judgment because he asserts that it was based on rule 60(b )(6), which provides that a 
court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order based on "any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). A motion 
made under rule 60(b)(6) must be made "within a reasonable time," and is not limited to 
vJ 90 days. 
As shown, Perea is wrong to suggest the district court could consider his post-
judgment motion under rule 60(b)(6). But even if it could, his motion did not justify 
relief. Rather than showing some flaw in the judgment or a just reason to set it aside, 
Perea' s motion instead improperly sought to amend the petition by adding a new claim 
for relief. A post-judgment motion is an improper vehicle to amend a petition, and the 
district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion here. 
As an alternative ground to deny Perea's post-judgment motion, the district court 
evaluated Perea's motion under rule 60(b)(6). It held that even under that rule Perea was 
-11-
still not entitled to relief because the motion did "not raise[] a meritorious defense to 
justify setting aside the dismissal of the petition." R322. 
The district court summarily dismissed Perea's petition because all of its claims 
had been "previously-and fully-adjudicated by the Utah Supreme Court in the matter 
of State v. Perea, 322 P.3d 624 (Utah 2013)." R67. Perea did not even address this fact 
in his rule 60(b) motion. R206-220. The district court correctly determined that Perea's 
motion offered no basis upon which the court should have set aside the dismissal of those 
claims. R322. The district court correctly found that Ms. Valencia's affidavit had no 
relation or relevance to the claims asserted in the petition. Id. 
The district court noted that in his motion for relief from judgment, Perea 
presented an entirely new claim "without regard to the claims he had previously 
adjudicated and that have previously been dismissed." R322. The motion attempted to 
present new evidence in the form of a new affidavit from Ms. Valencia.3 Essentially, 
Perea was asking the district court to allow him to amend his dismissed petition to add a 
new claim. What Perea was asking for was not appropriate or necessary. 
A party may not amend a complaint after a final adjudication unless a rule 60(b) 
motion is granted. National Advertising Co. v. Murray City Corp., 2006 UT App 75, 
3 Perea spends most of the argument portion of his brief discussing why he 
believes Ms. Valencia's affidavit is important. Aplt. Br. pp. 15-25. But this argument is 
irrelevant to the question of whether the district court was required to set aside the 
judgment dismissing the already-litigated claims Perea's petition exclusively raised. 
Argument about the importance of the new evidence does not solve the problem that the 
motion for relief from judgment was untimely and presented no legally appropriate basis 
to grant relief from the summary dismissal order. 
-12-
~13, 131 P.3d 872, cert. denied 138 P.3d 589. But under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
~ Act, a petitioner may file a petition for post-conviction relief on the ground that "newly 
discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction or 
sentence." Utah Code Ann. §78B-9-104(l)(e). As the Utah Supreme Court has 
recognized, denial of a rule 60(b) motion does not preclude a petitioner from "rais[ing] 
his newly discovered evidence claims in a separate petition for post-conviction relief." 
Carter v. State, 2015 UT 38 at ~8. 
The district court pointed out that Perea's claim would more appropriately be 
brought in a successive petition for post-conviction relief. R323. The State suggested in 
its opposition to the rule 60(b) motion that, if Perea believed he had newly discovered 
evidence that would entitle him to post-conviction relief, the proper avenue for seeking 
relief was to file a new petition for post-conviction relief under Utah Code section 78B-9-
l 04( 1 )( e ), where he could raise a claim of newly discovered evidence.4 
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it con-ectly determined that 
even under subsection 60(b )(6), Perea was not entitled to relief from judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm. 
4 Perea has not filed a new post-conviction petition based on newly discovered 
evidence. This appeal does not toll any applicable time bars or procedural bars under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
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Respectfully submitted on May 9, 2016. 
SEAND.REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
Assistant Solicitor General 
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RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER, UT R RCP Rule 60 
I West's Utah Code Annotated 
I State Court Rules 
I Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annas) 
I Part VII. Judgment 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 
RULE 60. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
Currentness 
<Rule 60 effective May I, 2016. See also, Rule 60 effective until May I, 2016.> 
(a) Clerical mistakes. The court may correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever 
one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. The court may do so on motion or on its own, with or without 
notice. After a notice of appeal has been tiled and while the appeal is pending, the mistake may be corrected only with leave 
of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon just terms, 
the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(b )(I) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(b)(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under Rule 59(b); 
(b)(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct ofan opposing party; 
0J (b )( 4) the judgment is void; 
(b)(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed 
or vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or 
(b)(6) any other reason that justifies relief. 
(c) Timing and effect of the motion. A motion under paragraph (b) must be tiled within a reasonable time and for reasons in 
paragraph (b )(I), (2), or (3), not more than 90 days after entry of the judgment or order or, if there is no judgment or order, 
from the date of the proceeding. The motion docs not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. 
-ti (d) Other power to grant relief. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a 
party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining 
any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
Credits 
[Amended effective April I, 1998; May I, 2014; May I, 20 I 6.] 
Rules Civ. Proc., Rule 60, UT R RCP Rule 60 
current with amendments received through February I, 2016. 
Addendum B 
Addendum B 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 






JAN l 2 2015 
SEC0NO 
DISTRICT COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Case No. 140907173 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
Respondent. 
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's Petition for Relief 
Under the Post Conviction Remedies Act filed on November 11, 2014. 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C(h)( 1) the Cou1i has reviewed 
the Petition to determine whether "any claim has been adjudicated in a prior 
proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face" and 
if it is appropriate to "issue an order dismissing the claim." 
The Court has reviewed the Petition and has determined that the 
claims offered in the petition have already been previously-and fully-
adjudicated by the Utah Supreme Court in the matter of State v. Perea, 322 
P.3d 624 (Utah 2013 ). While in the course of that adjudication the Utah 
Supreme Court did hold that this Court made certain errors, it also 
determined that any such errors were harmless. Id. at 630. This Court, 
nono61 
Order of Summary Dismissal 
Case No. 140907173 
Page 2 ofJ 
therefore, declines to exercise its discretion to correct these errors and will 
refrain from in any way disturbing the determination of the Utah Supreme 
Court. On this basis the Court herby ORDERS that the petition is 
DISMISSED. 
Dated this 'f day of January 2015. 
Ernie W. Jones 
District Court Judge 
---
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the / Z day of _~...::r...z+.=-=------4--' 2015, I sent 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling to Pe · ioner and Respondent 
as follows: 
Randall W. Richards ( /J",ID ty_uv.uP) 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Richards & Brown, P.C., 
73 8 University Park Blvd. # 140 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
Utah Attorney General Criminal Appeals Division 
Attorney for Respondent 
P .0. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
RULING AND ORDER ON 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
Trial Court Case No. 140907173 
Appellate Court Case No. 20150144 
Judge Ernie W. Jones 
THE MA TIER IS BEFORE THE COURT on Petitioner's Motion for Relief from 
Judgment filed on July 23, 2015. The State filed an opposition on September 21, 2015. Petitioner 
did not file a reply, and the time for filing a reply is now past. See Utah R. Civ. Pro. Rule 7(c)(I). 
Although neither party has filed a request to submit for· decision, the Court of Appeals has 
ordered this court to enter a ruling on Petitioner's motion within 60 days after remand. 
Therefore, the court now enters its ruling DENYING Petitioner's motion as follows. 
Petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief on November 12, 2014. The court 
reviewed the petition pursuant to rule 65C(h)(I) and entered an order dismissing the petition on 
January 12, 2015, because all of Petitioner's claims had already been fully adjudicated by the 
Utah Supreme Court in State v. Perea, 2013 UT 68. 
Petitioner now asks this court to set aside its order of summary dismissal pursuant to rule 
60(b)(6). Petitioner alleges that on July 2, 2015-seven months after this court dismissed the 
petition-Sarah Valencia informed Petitioner's counsel that she had been pressured to testify 
falsely during Petitioner's criminal trial. Ms. Valencia signed an affidavit recanting her trial 
testimony, and Petitioner attached a copy of her affidavit to his motion. According to Petitioner, 
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because the Supreme Court heavily weighed Sarah Valencia's testimony in detem1ining that any 
errors at Petitioner's criminal trial were harmless, the court should grant Petitioner relief from 
judgment based upon her affidavit. 
In response, the State contends Petitioner's motion cannot be filed under rule 60(b )(6) 
because he is claiming newly-discovered evidence under rule 60(b)(2). As such, Petitioner had 
90 days after the court dismissed the petition to file his motion. Because Petitioner filed his 
motion over seven months after the court entered its order, according to the State, the motion is 
untimely. 
To the extent Petitioner's motion is more properly labeled as a motion under rule 
60(b)(2), the court finds that it is untimely and dismisses it on that basis. However, to the extent 
Petitioner's motion is more properly submitted under rule 60(6)(6), the court concludes the 
motion is timely. 1 A motion under rule 60(6)(6) must be filed within a "reasonable time." 
Petitioner filed the motion only three weeks after learning of Ms. Valencia's allegations, which is 
a reasonable time under the rule. 
However, even if the motion is timely under rule 60(6)(6), the court concludes Petitioner 
has not raised a meritorious defense to justify setting aside the dismissal of the petition. See 
Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, ~ 108. Ms. Valencia's affidavit has no relation or relevance to 
the claims asserted in the petition, and Petitioner offers no basis upon which the court should set 
aside the dismissal of those claims. Rather, Petitioner presents an entirely new issue to the court 
without regard to the claims he has previously adjudicated and that have previously been 
dismissed. A motion for relief from judgment is, therefore, improper in this circumstance. 
1 Because Ms. Valencia's affidavit is not newly-discovered evidence that puts any of the claims in the petition in a 
new light, the claim, arguably, does not fall into the rule 60(b)(2) subsection. 
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Indeed, as suggested by the State, Petitioner's claim would more appropriately be brought in a 
new petition for post-conviction relief. 
Accordingly, Petitioner's motion is denied. This ruling and order is the order of the 
court. No further order under rule 7(f)(2) is required. 
Dated this _{.~"day of October, 2015. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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Attorney for Petitioner 
938 University Park Blvd Suitel40 
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